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ABSTRACT
Patent trolls are categorically demonized as threatening American innovation and industry. But whether they are a threat that antitrust law
is equipped to deal with is a complex question that depends on the
particular type of patent troll and activities they engage in. This Article
looks specifically at privateer patent trolls: entities that acquire their
patents from operating entities and assert them against other industry
members. In the particular context of privateering, antitrust law is almost certainly not the proper legal solution. Privateering does raise
significant issues: circumventing litigation constraints, evading licensing obligations, and raising the cost and frequency of patent assertions.
Nevertheless, there are clear doctrinal and practical roadblocks to
leveraging antitrust law to police privateering activity generally, and
there exist readily available alternative regimes that are more naturally suited to the task. Antitrust law’s role in governing privateering
activity should instead be more narrowly guided by its unique
strengths, such as limiting collusive behavior.
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ANTITRUST

Antitrust law and patent law are in a well-documented, fundamental tension. On the one hand, antitrust law is explicitly charged with preventing and
breaking up monopolies. On the other hand, patent law is explicitly charged
with granting them, at least temporarily. This tension has long inspired influential writing from a number of academics in its own right.1 Now, the emergence of a more recent problem has brought that tension to its zenith: patent
trolls.
Patent trolls—or, less disparagingly, “patent assertion entities”—are entities that acquire and enforce patents without actually practicing them.2 That
is, they make no product or service using the patent. Rather, their entire
business model is predicated on acquiring licensing fees from entities that
actually provide goods and services (so-called “operating entities”).3 Critics
see these trolls as a pure nuisance: like their namesake, they create nothing
and extract tolls from those trying to productively conduct their business.
They argue that trolls are responsible for “an explosion of abusive patent
litigation designed not to reward innovation . . . but to threaten companies in
order to extract settlements based on questionable claims.”4 Some surveys
have suggested that patent troll litigation makes up more than 60% of all
patent litigation in the United States.5 Academics have estimated that patent
trolls cost operating entities almost $30 billion in 2011 alone.6 Patent trolls
have also been vilified in popular media, ranging from NPR’s This American
1.
See LAURENCE WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1942); John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation, 65
ANTITRUST L.J. 449 (1997); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the
Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515 (2015); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust:
Peaceful Coexistence?, 54 MICH. L. REV. 199 (1955); George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent
License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1977).
2.
See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf.
3.
See id.; Thomas A. Hemphill, The Paradox of Patent Assertion Entities, AM. ENTER.
INST. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-paradox-of-patent-assertion-entities/
.
4.
Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/takingpatent-trolls-protect-american-innovation.
5.
Id.
6.
James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014).
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Life7 to HBO’s Last Week Tonight.8 These perceived costs of patent trolling
have inspired a number of potential solutions, with antitrust law perhaps
chief among them.
At first glance, the nexus between antitrust law and patent trolls seems
clear: if litigious patent trolls are unfairly deteriorating the markets for various patented goods, antitrust law can step in and reassert the proper rules for
efficient competition. Thus far, however, the popular and scholarly literature
surrounding antitrust law’s proposed role in policing patent trolls has suffered from two key failures.
First, antitrust scholars have largely failed to distinguish between different types of patent trolls and patent troll activities.9 Whether antitrust law
can provide a solution—if a problem indeed exists—may vary greatly depending on, among other things: the particular patent owner’s conduct; its
“relationships or connections to operating entities;” the nature of “downstream product” markets; and potential “upstream technology markets.”10 In
this way, patent troll behavior varies too much to allow for a single conclusory answer:
Along one continuum, unilateral [patent troll] conduct may vary
from acquiring a single patent or unrelated patents to amassing a
thicket of closely related patents covering multiple facets of a single
product or industry. The [assertion] strategy may vary as well, from
blanketing an industry with demands for royalty payments . . . to
engaging in more targeted demands, accompanied by claim
charts. . . . Along another continuum, [patent trolls] may cooperate
with one or more operating entities when asserting patents, ranging
from unspoken agreements to explicit royalty- or revenue-sharing
provisions.11

7.
This American Life: When Patents Attack!, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (July 22, 2011),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
8.
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patent Trolls, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA.
9.
Many pieces draw no distinctions or make no acknowledgement of the different
potential types of patent trolls and their divergent activities at all. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier,
Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, 2013 CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON. 1 (2013); Collin A. Rose, A Match Made for Court: Patent Assertion Entities and the
Federal Trade Commission, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 95 (2014); NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL
ET AL., PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (June 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; Bert Foer & Sandeep Vaheesan, Patent Trolls in the
Cross Hairs, AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/
patent-trolls-cross-hairs.
10.
Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of Justice And
Federal Trade Commission Workshop On Patent Assertion Entity Activities — “Follow The
Money”, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 437 (2014).
11.
Id.
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This latter kind of activity—using patent trolls as a roundabout means to
enforce patents against competitors—is frequently referred to as patent “privateering,” and is the specific focus of this Article.12
Second, where the literature has distinguished between different types of
patent trolls, it has still failed to account for the costs of expanding or reshaping antitrust law to cover patent troll activity, as opposed to leveraging
existing legal solutions. Nowhere is this failure more glaring than in the
realm of privateering. Academics13 and industry members14 who propose antitrust intervention have offered little to no balancing against alternative legal frameworks for grappling with privateers.15 Nor do they address the gaps
in antitrust law—described later in this Article16—that would need to be
covered to apply antitrust law to privateers in the first place. This Article
seeks to improve both the specificity and cross-doctrinality of patent troll
analysis in the existing antitrust literature by (1) analyzing the shortcomings
of antitrust law in policing privateering activity specifically, and (2) considering alternative legal regimes that would require little or no alteration to
provide a solution.
Where alternative legal regimes are available, there should be a great
deal of skepticism towards applying antitrust law. False positives are particularly costly due to the nature of antitrust’s treble damages. To counterbal12.
See, e.g., Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering and Modern Letters of Marque and Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2012); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us,
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 63 (2012); Susan Decker, Google Seeks Probe of Patent Privateers Defended by Nokia, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Apr. 5, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-05/google-seeks-probe-of-patent-privateers-de
fended-by-nokia; Leslie A. Gordon, ‘Patent Privateers’ Do Legal Legwork for Big-Time Tech
Companies, A.B.A. JOURNAL (July 1, 2013, 08:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/
mag_article/small_companies_pick_up_the_cost_of_patent_privateering_litigation.
13.
See generally, e.g., Carrier, supra note 9, at 1; Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D.
Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, 12 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust
_source/apr13_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf; Phillip Malone, Clinical Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School, Panelist at Patent Assertion Entities Workshop, How Does Antitrust
Apply to the Potential Efficiencies and Harms Caused by Patent Assertion Entities Activity?
155-63 (Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Patent%20Assertion%20Entity%20Activities%20Workshop%20/pae_transcript.pdf; Comments of
the American Antitrust Institute on Patent Assertion Entities (Feb. 21, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0011.pdf.workshops/pae/com
ments/paew-0011.pdf.
14.
See, e.g., Comments of Google, Blackberry, Earthlink & Red Hat to the Federal
Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice on Patent Assertion Entities (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0049.pdf; Public Comments
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation Regarding Patent Assertion Entity Activities (Apr. 5,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0064.pdf.
15.
Alternative legal frameworks for curtailing privateer activity are discussed infra
Subsections I.C & II.B.
16.
Infra Subsections I.A, I.B, II.A, & III.A.
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ance those costs, “socially optimal antitrust rules” would have to
“underdeter” as a rule.17 Where regimes conflict, the primary hazard is for
one to warp the other; in particular, given the deep tensions between the
goals of patent and antitrust laws, the potential for interference between regimes is likely high.18
In fact, the Supreme Court has already recognized limiting antitrust law
where alternative solutions are available. For example, in Credit Suisse LLC
v. Billing,19 the Court dismissed antitrust claims brought against underwriting firms accused of conspiring to manipulate initial public offering prices.
The Court held that the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
implicitly preempted antitrust regulation of the securities industry, determining the need for antitrust enforcement to be “unusually small,” the prospect
for mistakes to be “unusually likely,” and the potential “harm to the efficient
functioning of the securities markets” to be serious.20 This hesitation to leverage antitrust law when other solutions exist can be traced back at least as
far as NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., in which the Court declined to apply
antitrust law to a particular type of regulatory fraud in part because “unfair
competition laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws” existed as less
costly alternatives.21
The existing literature on patent privateering generally points to three
key features that allegedly open the door to antitrust involvement: evasion of
litigation constraints,22 evasion of licensing obligations,23 and increased cost
and frequency of patent litigation.24 This Article analyzes each feature in
Parts I, II, and III, respectively, examining the shortcomings in applying
antitrust law to each perceived problem, and offering an alternative solution
or perspective that should command our attention instead. This Article does
not claim that the existence of alternative legal regimes to potentially govern
privateering activity literally preempts antitrust law in that sphere. Rather, it
highlights those alternatives—as well as the roadblocks in applying antitrust
law as it now exists to privateers—as convincing evidence that antitrust
17.
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and
Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMP. LAW & ECON 469 (2009);
see also Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST (K. Hylton ed., 2014).
18.
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1815-17 (1984) (“The intersection of antitrust law and patent policy has proved to be a
source of perpetual confusion and controversy . . . manifest[ing] itself in the continual flux of
patent-antitrust doctrine, the apparent inconsistency among many segments of the doctrine,
and the difficulty courts have in articulating rules and standards.”). See sources cited supra
note 1.
19.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007).
20.
Id. at 277.
21.
Nynex Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998).
22.
See sources cited infra notes 25-27.
23.
See infra notes 74-76.
24.
See sources cited infra notes 123-126.
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should play a modest role in this context. Deepening this contrast, in Part IV,
the Article concludes by examining collusion via privateers as an example of
the type of activity properly and uniquely suited to antitrust regulation—an
example that acts as a guidepost for the modest role of antitrust moving
forward.
I. EVADING CONSTRAINTS

ON

LITIGATION ACTIVITY

Operating entities typically face retributive and reputational constraints
on their ability to litigate their patent rights. In terms of retribution, rival
operating entities likely “each possess patents that implicate one another’s
products,” so “they enter into cross licenses or (similarly) abstain from suing
one another . . . [in] the patent equivalent of . . . mutual assured destruction.”25 In terms of reputation, operating entities face “customers exerting
pressure to settle litigation or shareholders skeptical of patent enforcement.”26 Operating entities might also need to engage with “standards-setting organizations, where a reputation as a non-aggressor can increase the
likelihood that a firm’s technology is included in standards.”27
One of the primary arguments for using antitrust law against patent privateering is that patent privateering enables operating entities to avoid these
litigation constraints that they would otherwise face.28 A privateer, it is argued, faces no threat of patent counter-suit or reputational damage since they
produce nothing themselves. As a result, with sufficient opacity separating
them from the privateer, an operating entity that exercises control over a
privateer is able to leverage their patents to a much greater extent than their
competitors, raising their competitors’ costs in an anticompetitive fashion,
and necessitating antitrust involvement.29
This argument for antitrust involvement, however, ignores the implicit
costs of litigation constraints, the extent to which existing antitrust doctrine
25.
Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 13; see also Edith Ramirez, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Opening Remarks: Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities: What Antitrust
Enforcers Can Do 7 (June 20, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/competition-law-patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/130620
paespeech.pdf (stating that patent privateering through “a lack of transparency,” enables assertion without “mutually assured destruction by proxy”); Eli Dourado, How Patent Privateers
Have Eroded Mutually Assured Destruction in the Computer Industry, THE UMLAUT (Oct. 2,
2013), https://theumlaut.com/2013/10/02/patent-privateers/.
26.
Carrier, supra note 9, at 7.
27.
Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 13, at 4.
28.
See sources cited supra notes 25-27.
29.
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 25-27; Julie Brill, Commissioner, Introductory
Remarks at 2014 International CES CEA Innovation Policy Summit: Patent Litigation Reform:
Who Are You Calling a Troll? (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_
pages/antitrust-law/Committee%20Documents/Subcommittee%20on%20IP%20Acquisitions
%20and%20Licensing/Brill%20-%20PAEs%20and%20Legislation.pdf; Dourado, supra note
25; Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering: Patents as Weapons, U. CIN. L. REV. BLOG (Feb.
19, 2015), http://uclawreview.org/2015/02/19/patent-privateering-patents-as-weapons/#_ftn10.
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forecloses intervention, and the potential for more efficient transparencybased solutions. These shortcomings are each examined in detail below.
A. The Costs of Litigation Constraints
A fundamental error that most antitrust arguments against patent privateering make is assuming that the status quo disrupted by privateering is
inherently efficient or desirable.30 But the efficiency valence of the status
quo—in which operating entities acquire and maintain patent portfolios defensively as bargaining chips, afraid and unwilling to litigate infringement—
is questionable. Retributional and reputational constraints on patent assertion
are not without their own costs, and the increased litigation and enforcement
normally associated with patent privateers may actually work as a pro-competitive market force.
Both operating entities and consumers bear significant costs associated
with the litigation-constrained status quo. First, acquiring and maintaining
patents for barter and defensive purposes has explicit costs. Second, patents
are likely to be systemically undervalued when they are never fully monetized, raising the price of innovation. Finally, a lack of opportunities to litigate and test the validity of patents allows weak patents to remain in
circulation as sham leverage. These costs are borne directly by operating
entities and are likely partially passed through to consumers of downstream
products.
In terms of explicit costs, operating entities must spend money to acquire and maintain patents for use in maintaining mutually assured destruction. As Professor Mark Lemley and Intel’s General Counsel A. Douglas
Melamed note, “smartphone companies alone spent over $14 billion acquiring patents in the last three years to deter or offset assertions by other operating entities.”31 In most cases, we should expect that the cost of defensive
stockpiling would be equal to the expected liability in litigation without mutually assured destruction. If the cost were more, the defending company
would generally choose litigation. If the cost were less, then the defensive
patents would be undervalued; the price of those patents would eventually be
bid up by other competitors seeking defense, arbitrageurs, or perhaps even
the asserting company to strengthen its position. In this sense, privateers
would not be increasing costs relative to the status quo, despite disrupting it.
Such disruption may in fact be procompetitive. To the extent that one
competitor may be able to wield a destructive power beyond its actual patent
portfolio value—say, by refusing to do business with any company that sues
30.
For examples of the failure to consider status quo costs, see Popofsky & Laufert,
supra note 13, at 4-5; Comments of Google et al., supra note 14, at 11-13; Ewing, supra note
12; Carrier, supra note 9, at 11.
31.
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2130 (2014).
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it for patent infringement32—evading reputational constraints would be
procompetitive. Privateers are also more likely to prefer lump-sum payments
rather than running royalties,33 so that their particular form of enforcement is
less likely to “increase prices charged to buyers, reduce product sales, [or]
result in deadweight loss.”34
In terms of under-monetization, operating entities may be failing to account for the opportunity costs of using their patents in a purely defensive
manner. By reaching only one potential use of their patents and foregoing
the royalties and settlements gained through actual assertion, they are essentially “leaving money on the table.”35 In the long run, systemic under-monetization of patents would tend to depress the prices companies are willing to
pay to acquire or maintain them.36 This would in turn decrease the willingness to spend to develop patents, since the potential to eventually sell off
rights is lower.37 By allowing operating entities to reap the full monetary
value of their patents, the ex ante value of developing a patent in the first
place is increased, as well as the incentive to innovate.38
Finally, in terms of junk patents, the practice of avoiding litigation at all
costs allows bogus patents to remain in play. While patent trolls typically
hope for settlement rather than actual litigation,39 they at least present the
32.
Intel was accused of participating in precisely this type of behavior, and forced to
settle antitrust charges as a result. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Accepts Settlement of Charges Against Intel (Mar. 17, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1999/03/ftc-accepts-settlement-charges-against-intel.
33.
See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2134 (“Because their interest is in
generating cash and their business models often depend critically on cash flow from patent
assertions, they have no incentive to prefer running royalties and, if anything, are likely to
prefer lump-sum payments.”). Cf. Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, supra note 9, at 9
(“Future payment streams [for patent trolls] are unlikely to be large given that settlements tend
to be paid in lump sums.”).
34.
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2134 & nn.71-72.
35.
Id. at 2137.
36.
See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Did Trips Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1615, 1623 (2009) (examining the
general elasticity between patent monetization potential—vis-à-vis patent duration—and incentives to innovate).
37.
Id.
38.
Jorge Lemus and Emil Temnyalov have developed a theoretical model for privateering and its effect on R&D spending supporting this argument. Cf. Jorge Lemus & Emil
Temnyalov, Outsourcing Patent Enforcement: The Effect of “Patent Privateers” on Litigation
and R&D Investments 37-38 (Dec. 30, 2014) (Northwestern Univ. working paper) (on file with
Northwestern University Department of Economics). They find that by reducing the transaction costs of patent monetization, privateers “can increase R&D incentives even when: they do
not invest in R&D, do not use the patents to produce products, do not have any cost advantage
in litigation . . . , [and] lower total industry profits extracting a positive amount of rents.” Id. at
38. Their conclusion holds even assuming that privateers simultaneously “reduc[e] the value of
defensive portfolios,” which would partially undercut “ex-ante incentives to innovate.” Id.
39.
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 467
(2014).
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defending company with an opportunity to challenge the underlying patent if
the defending company believes it is invalid. In the world of mutually assured destruction, a company who challenges one possibly invalid patent of
another company could provoke the wrath of the entire defending company’s portfolio—a small skirmish leading to total nuclear war.40 Challenging the patent of a privateer with a more limited portfolio, on the other hand,
allows the conflict to remain a small skirmish. Companies selling off bits
and pieces of their portfolios to privateers thus breaks the litigation stalemate
and ensures the patents involved stand up to scrutiny.
In short, the costs of maintaining defensive portfolios, foregoing offensive revenue, and allowing junk patents to remain in circulation may themselves be acting as anticompetitive and inefficient forces. Patent
privateering, which disrupts these forces, should therefore not be compared
to a perfectly competitive market for intellectual property or downstream
products. The antitrust valence of patent privateering cannot be calculated in
such a vacuum—it must consider the existing alternative of patent détente,
which itself proves costly and distortionary.
B. Third-Party Intervention and Noerr-Pennington Immunity
Using third parties as privateers to avoid retributive or reputational litigation constraints may also already be immunized from antitrust scrutiny
under existing doctrine. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court established that the right to petition—protected under the First Amendment—grants presumptive immunity
from liability under the antitrust laws for “attempts to influence the passage
or enforcement of laws.”41 In that case, a group of railroads had engaged
with a public relations firm “to conduct a publicity campaign against . . .
truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws . . . destructive
of the trucking business.”42 A group of truckers, in turn, sought relief from
those actions under the antitrust laws. Despite the clear detrimental effects
on competition, and even assuming a subjective intent “to destroy [the truckers] as competitors,” the Court nevertheless concluded that the defendant
railroads were immune from antitrust liability. This doctrinal thread was reinforced and expanded just a few years later in United Mine Workers v.
40.
The litigation between Motorola and Apple over smartphone patents provides an
example of how quickly the conflict between two large, overlapping portfolio holders may
escalate—and how long and costly the resulting war may be. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility,
Inc. v. Apple Inc., In the Matter of Certain Wireless Communication Devices, ITC Inv. No.
337-TA-745 (2010); Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2010); Apple Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc. (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2010); In the Matter of Certain Mobile Devices and
Related Software, ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-750 (2010); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2012).
41.
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135
(1961).
42.
Id. at 129.
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Pennington, highlighting the irrelevance of “anticompetitive purpose” in
granting immunity to petition, and establishing the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine of antitrust immunity:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct
is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme
itself violative of the Sherman Act. The jury should have been so
instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of this evidence,
we cannot hold this lapse to be mere harmless error.43
Noerr-Pennington doctrine thus appears to immunize privateering activity, if not outright, then at least with respect to the evasion of retributive or
reputational litigation constraints to raise competitors’ costs. The activity in
Noerr and Pennington was lobbying, but the doctrine has explicitly been
expanded to reach adversarial litigation.44 And the Court in Noerr directly
addressed the question of whether using intermediaries to conceal activity
invalidates the antitrust immunity afforded by the First Amendment:
Nor was the railroads’ campaign made violative of the Sherman Act
by their use of the so-called third-party technique, whereby propaganda actually circulated by a party in interest is given the appearance of being the spontaneously expressed views of independent
persons and civic groups.45
With only one exception, federal courts have sensibly combined these
strands of logic to conclude that sponsors of litigation—transparent or otherwise—have the same claim to Noerr-Pennington immunity as direct litigants.46 And this immunity is not a mere doctrinal quirk or loophole:
There is a clear public interest in ensuring that meritorious claims
are brought before the courts, irrespective of the subjective motiva43.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 657 (1965).
44.
See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
(“[T]he right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”).
45.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140.
46.
See, e.g., Sosa v. DIRECTV, 437 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2006); A.D. Bedell
Wholesale v. Philip Morris, 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001); Balt. Scrap v. David J. Joseph Co.,
237 F.3d 394, 397 (4th Cir. 2001); Liberty Lake Invs. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155 (9th Cir.
1993). Cf. In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t would be
an unwarranted extension of Noerr-Pennington’s protection to hold that a party without an
interest in a case sufficient to allow it to directly petition the courts may nonetheless . . .
encourag[e] and assist[ ] the lawsuits of others.”). See also M. Sean Royall & Seth M.M.
Stodder, From Burlington Northern to Baltimore Scrap, 15 ANTITRUST 47 (2001) (“Of the
various reported decisions that have addressed this issue, virtually all have held that parties
who sponsor litigation are entitled to Noerr immunity to the same extent as the direct parties to
the litigation.”).
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tions of the claimants or their supporters . . . many important cases
concerning vital public interests—such as the environment, civil
rights, or other issues—might [otherwise] never be brought into
court and resolved.47
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine takes aim at balancing the need for fair competition, the freedom to petition, and the public benefit that litigation provides in a common law system.
It would be inconsistent, to say the least, if a company could secretly
pay a third party’s legal fees purely to increase the nuisance faced by its
competitor, but could not use third parties like privateers to assert its own
legal claims more effectively. At least in the latter case, the company actually has some plausible competitive reason to be involved: either its patent
or its shared revenue stream is being asserted. Their stake in the outcome
beyond just raising their competitor’s costs legitimates their involvement.
Privateering may nevertheless raise issues of destabilizing mutually assured
destruction or reputational restraint, but Noerr-Pennington and its progeny
suggest that antitrust law does not have a role to play.48
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not without its limits. But the core
issue is one of underlying merit, not transparency or reciprocity. Specifically, the Court has established a “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington,
predicated upon a two-part test.49 First, “the lawsuit must be objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits.”50 Second, if the lawsuit is objectively baseless, the
court “examine[s] the litigant’s subjective motivation,” to determine whether
it is an attempt to interfere with a competitor through “governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process.”51
Privateering activity could fall within this sham exception, but that
seems unlikely. Starting with the first “objectively baseless” prong, pri47.
Royall & Stodder, supra note 46, at 51.
48.
Courts examining patent privateering have not yet specifically addressed this argument. In practice, Noerr-Pennington immunity has been raised as a defense by at least one
high-profile accused independent patent troll, but the case ultimately reached settlement, leaving the argument open to privateers moving forward. See Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls are
Getting First Amendment Protection for their Demand Letters, A.B.A. JOURNAL (May 1, 2014,
09:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent_trolls_are_getting_first_a
mendment_protection_for_demand_letters; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Bars Patent Assertion Entity from Using Deceptive Tactics (Nov. 6, 2014), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc-settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entityusing-deceptive. Additionally, one district court has determined that independent patent troll
demand letters are protected from RICO penalties by Noerr-Pennington. In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 921 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Hence, while case law
is sparse, these instances at least support an optimistic view towards privateers raising NoerrPennington arguments moving forward.
49.
Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
50.
Id. at 60.
51.
Id. at 61 (quotation marks omitted).
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vateers acquire their patents (or enforcement rights thereof) from operating
entities, so logically the patents were originally acquired or developed as
part of that business. The patents must have covered something either necessary to the business, or sufficiently cost saving to outweigh the investment.
Empirical analyses of this concept are hard to conduct, but the limited data
available support this hypothesis; the patent quality of many privateer portfolios is at least as high as those of operating entities.52 Similarly, the patents
of privateers fare at least as well in reexamination proceedings as the patents
of operating entities.53 Moreover, the enforcement efforts are clearly targeted
towards practicing competitors, not blanketing users or multiple industries
with vague, copied threats. Hence, unlike so-called “bottom-feeder” patent
trolls that rely on pure volume—a huge arsenal of low-quality junk patents
or a large number of demand letters54—the privateer model would be expected to rely on high-quality patents and underlying claims that are not
objectively baseless.55
The sham exception’s second prong—subjective intent—is not likely to
be met, either. A company asserting its patent against its competitors
through a privateer would not be focused on ‘process’ as opposed to ‘outcome’; it would genuinely hope to succeed on the merits and receive damages through a finding of infringement. The costs of litigation are simply a
bonus. This is particularly true in the case of a privateer controlled by an
operating entity. Professor Marina Lao explains:
By definition, a patent or copyright infringement suit is a suit for the
exclusion of a competitor; if the intellectual property plaintiff wins,
the infringer is excluded from competition. It is by winning an infringement suit that patent or copyright owners can most effectively
exclude a competitor. Therefore, it is unlikely that these plaintiffs
merely hope to interfere with a competitor’s business through the
process of bringing an infringement suit, rather than through a successful outcome. . . . [T]he second-prong would mean that few infringement suits (even after being shown to be objectively baseless)
would be considered ‘shams’ because the intellectual property

52.
See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012); see
also Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology - an Empirical
Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Ctr.
for Econ. Policy Research), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102.
53.
See Steve Moore, A Fractured Fairytale Part 3: More Patent Troll Myths,
IPWATCHDOG.COM (July 31, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/31/a-facturedfairytale-part-3-more-patent-troll-myths/id=43755/.
54.
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2126.
55.
The tendency for privateers to assert disproportionately meritorious claims is explored infra Section III.C.
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plaintiff usually hopes to prevail, in order to completely exclude the
competitor.56
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that privateers file all their infringement suits with legitimate intent. The incentive for nuisance litigation
remains. But at a minimum, the practical burden of demonstrating sham intent would be disproportionately high when it comes to privateers relative to
other forms of patent trolls, precisely because of their interplay with operating entities.
In short, with most privateer suits likely to have substantial merit and
without a demonstration of the requisite subjective sham intent, Noerr-Pennington almost certainly immunizes privateering activity.
C. Transparency-Based Solutions
The costs of privateering activity are likely no higher than the costs of
reputational and retributive constraints on patent assertion, in part because of
the procompetitive destabilizing benefits. Furthermore, existing antitrust
doctrine likely immunizes privateering activity through Noerr-Pennington.
Rather than distort antitrust law to proscribe privateering activity, transparency-based solutions would likely address any remaining concerns more
easily. Specifically, greater transparency in patent transfers and ownership
would remove any potential for companies to evade constraints such as mutually assured destruction or reputational damage through privateering. To
the extent that evasion is seen as a problem at all, full transparency offers a
clear solution: a competitor that is sued for infringement by a privateer can
retributively sue the company that sold its patent to that privateer, if the
competitor is able to determine the identity of said company.57 As long as
the suit can be effectively traced back to its operating entity progenitor, the
operating entity risks triggering mutually assured destruction or developing a
bad reputation in the eyes of standard-setting organizations.
Currently, there is neither “an effective way of confirming who owns a
particular patent” nor an effective way of determining “what patents a particular person of company owns.”58 Patent transferors and transferees frequently fail to record changes in ownership with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”) at all, and subsequent internal assignments to
shell or subsidiary companies (with potentially inconsistent self-identifica56.
Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 987 (2003).
57.
Ewing, supra note 12, at 6.
58.
Adi Kamdar, Whose Patent Is It Anyway? A New Bill to End Patent Anonymity,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 20, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/whose-patent
-it-anyway-new-bill-end-patent-anonymity.
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tion) creates further opacity as to the true owner or parties in interest.59
Sometimes patent owners will deliberately obfuscate ownership for explicitly strategic reasons, as in some high-profile cases.60 But in many cases, the
opacity is the purely incidental result of a broken system.61 Recordation
costs, poor record-keeping practices, bankruptcy, and legitimate complexities of corporate identity and ownership all contribute towards ownership
opacity.62
With this in mind, greater transparency could take the form of incentivizing more consistent and complete disclosures on the part of patent owners. One bill that has been proposed in the Senate, for example, requires
anyone filing a patent infringement lawsuit to disclose all parties with a financial interest in the outcome or “any other kind of interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”63 This language
would certainly include privateers engaged in contractual revenue-sharing
with operating entities, although it is admittedly overbroad.64 More practically, the bill would also treat “an assignment of all substantial rights” as a
change in the “ultimate parent entity,” and require that the patent office be
notified within three months.65 Other organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation have simply proposed higher penalties for failures to
disclose:
All patent owners should be required to keep their disclosures up to
date throughout the life of the patent, or else the patent will be unenforceable. For example, patent owners should be required to update ownership and litigation records in a timely fashion. And, with

59.
Colleen Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law 3 (Santa Clara Univ.
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-12, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1995664.
60.
See generally Ewing & Feldman, supra note 12 (examining the patent holdings of
Intellectual Ventures, noting assignments to thousands of shell companies and subsidiaries).
61.
See Chien, supra note 59.
62.
Id.
63.
Patent Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113 Cong. 1, § 3
(2013).
64.
The rippling economic effects of a patent suit can arguably extend quite far. For
example, in a suit over a semiconductor patent, if the patent were held to be invalid, every
business that sold a product using those semiconductors—phones, laptops, GPS devices—
would receive a financial upside through eliminated royalty payments somewhere along the
line. If those businesses then reduced the price of their products, products using competing
semiconductor technology might become comparatively less attractive to purchasers. Businesses selling complements to the semiconductors—say, software companies—may be positively affected in turn. And so on.
65.
Id.
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the exception of relevant trade secrets, licenses to a patent should be
reported within six months of their effective date.66
Any of these proposals would directly solve the underlying problem associated with privateers—evasion of litigation constraints through opacity.
Greater transparency in patent ownership could also be achieved by simply using existing information better. For example, it is currently possible to
search the patent records by initial assignee but not by current assignee, even
though the PTO has information on both.67 Making the records searchable by
maintenance fee payor68 might also shed some light on the operating entity
behind the privateer. Other existing data that the PTO “could track and make
publicly available/searchable include . . . whether it has been reexamined,
who requested the reexamination, [and] whether or not the current owner is a
large or small entity.”69 Any of these could point the recipient of a privateer’s demand letter in the direction of the operating entity that equipped it.
And it requires no new data, only efforts to make existing data more accessible to users.
Focusing on transparency offers a solution that is more tailored to
preventing companies from evading constraints on litigation through privateering. To the extent that evasion is seen as a problem, transparency targets
the actual source of that problem and offers a solution that does not require
rewriting key antitrust doctrine.
II. EVADING LICENSING COMMITMENTS
Another of the primary arguments for using antitrust law to diminish
patent privateering is that privateering allows operating entities to circumvent licensing commitments they have made. To induce a standard-setting
organization (“SSO”) to adopt their particular patented technology as part of
an industry standard, operating entities will frequently commit to license
their relevant patents along certain terms.70 Typically, these are so-called
“FRAND” commitments: a commitment to offer fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing terms.71 In practice, FRAND terms tend to have two
requirements: that a licensing rate would not destroy product viability if all
other patent holders involved in the standard charged the same amount72 and
66.
TION,

Elec. Frontier Found., Proposal to Improve the Notice Function, DEFEND INNOVAhttps://defendinnovation.org/proposal/improve-notice-function (last visited Jan. 31,

2016).
67.
Chien, supra note 59, at 6.
68.
Id. at 7.
69.
Id. at 6-7.
70.
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007).
71.
Id. at 671.
72.
This is designed to prevent detrimental “‘royalty stacking,’ in which the cumulative
demands of patent holders across the relevant technology or the device threaten to make it
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that patent holders license to any entity able to pay the going rate.73 The
alleged antitrust issue arises when operating entities sell their patents to privateers who do not themselves abide by the licensing commitments, either
refusing to license to certain businesses or demanding a higher royalty.74
Scholars generally suggest that Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) would apply to companies avoiding licensing obligations through privateers.75 This argument for
antitrust involvement, however, is pre-empted by existing antitrust doctrine,
and much simpler solutions can be found in existing contract law or estoppel. While antitrust involvement in this sort of privateering activity would
thus require overriding existing case law on the Sherman Act or significantly
expanding the scope of the FTC Act, solutions in contract law and estoppel
are already available.
A. Roadblocks in Applying Antitrust Law
Even if using privateers to circumvent licensing obligations is not immunized from antitrust law under the Noerr-Pennington arguments used in
Subsection I.B, applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 5 of the
FTC Act to this sort of privateering activity nevertheless faces significant
doctrinal and conceptual roadblocks.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations.”76 In practice, two factors are required to find
a Section 2 violation: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distineconomically unviable to offer the product.” Ann Armstrong et al., The Smartphone Royalty
Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones 2 (May
29, 2014), WILMERHALE, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Edito
rial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf;
see also Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Counsel for Intellectual Prop. & Int’l Antitrust, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Royalty Rates and Damages (Oct. 22,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/wong-ervin
_aba_program_frand_royalty_rates_10-22-14.pdf.
73.
See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 70.
74.
George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup
Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921 (2011) (“[O]pportunism in the standard-setting process is an antitrust problem.”) (quoting Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D.
Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 471 (2009)); Popofsky & Laufert, supra note
13, at 5; Comments of Google et al., supra note 14, at 16; David Balto, As Congress and
Enforcers Contemplate Patent Trolls, Don’t Forget About Privateering, HUFFINGTON POST:
HUFFPOST BUSINESS BLOG (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidbalto/as-congress-contemplates-_b_3000110.html.
75.
See Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 13, at 10-12; Comments of Google et al., supra
note 14, at 3-4; Schrepel, supra note 29.
76.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”77
Regarding the first factor, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that a patent alone confers monopoly power.78 But possession of a standardsessential patent may tip the balance in certain cases.79 As “the level of resources committed to the standard rises and the costs of switching to a new
technology mount, industry members may find themselves locked into using” the standards-essential patent.80 Depending on the availability of competing standards or substitute goods, this could convey significant market
power to the patent owner.
The second factor, however, demands “an element of anticompetitive
conduct” for there to be a violation, and this is where the Section 2 analysis
begins to break down for privateering.81 First, deception may specifically
need to be shown to demonstrate anticompetitive conduct in this context.
Stemming from older antitrust case law prohibiting collusion or other manipulation of the standard-setting process,82 the major cases addressing violations of SSO licensing obligations have thus far held that a showing of
deception is required to state a claim under the Sherman Act.83 As one FTC
Commissioner expressed, “there does not appear to be a single case that
finds breach of an SSO agreement—without proof that deception resulted in
acquisition of market power—a violation of the Sherman Act.”84
But whether licensing obligations generally follow a patent after its
transfer and attach to the new owner remains an “open question.”85 A partic77.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
78.
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
79.
See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 603, 605-10 (2007).
80.
Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Conference on
Standardization and the Law Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade: Recognizing the
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting 3 (Sept. 23, 2005), http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf.
81.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
82.
See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988);
American Soc. of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
83.
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 311 (3d Cir. 2007); Rambus,
Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
84.
Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Center for
the Protection of Intellectual Property Inaugural Academic Conference: The Commercial
Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation Economy 23 (Sept. 12, 2013) (emphasis added),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ssos-frand-and-antitrustlessons-economics-incomplete-contracts/130912cpip.pdf.
85.
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers,
and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231, 257 (2014). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
& USPTO, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT
TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (Jan. 8, 2013) (noting the unresolved nature of the
question, and comparing outcomes of alternative doctrinal paths), http://www.uspto.gov/about/
offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf; Renata Hesse,
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ular patent’s licensing obligations post-transfer may be even less clear, given
the great deal of variability between SSOs and their specific terms.86 It is not
fraudulent or deceptive for privateers receiving patents from operating entities to legitimately dispute the metes and bounds of the original licensing
obligations—for example, whether those obligations transferred with the
patent.87
Second, even when a plaintiff is able to prove deception, they must also
show “anticompetitive effect” for the deception to be considered anticompetitive conduct.88 Because an increase in royalty prices alone is not sufficient
to make out an anticompetitive effect, this would essentially mean demonstrating that the SSO would have chosen a different technology if they knew
the patent holder would eventually try to circumvent its licensing obligations.89 But this makes for a very costly fact- and expert-intensive inquiry, as
one would need to compare not only the technical specifications and benefits
of the alternative technologies presented to the SSO, but also their costs of
production, implementation, and potential popularity. This high bar—both in
terms of evidence needed as well as litigation costs—is likely prohibitive to
many who would seek to challenge privateer circumvention of licensing
obligations.
The problem of proving anticompetitive effect becomes even greater
when considering patent privateering activity specifically. As stated earlier,
privateers by definition do not actually practice the patents or participate in
the downstream product market. Therefore, their incentive structure in terms
of patent assertion is dictated entirely by maximizing royalties and settlements rather than increasing market share through injunctions or exclusion
orders.90 A standards-essential patent in the hands of a privateer would there-

Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ Antitrust Division, Six ‘Small’ Proposals for SSOs Before
Lunch 6 (Oct. 10, 2012) (recognizing the “inherent ambiguity” of FRAND and similar obligations in terms of scope), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf.
86.
See, e.g., Kesan & Hayes, supra note 85, at 252-56.
87.
See, e.g., Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2004) (disagreement
over term interpretation “does not rise to the level of fraud; at most, it alleges a contract
dispute”) (citing Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 819 F.2d 151, 152-53 (6th
Cir. 1987)); see also Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882
(6th Cir. 1990); O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989).
88.
Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456, 463 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001)); see also
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (highlighting the need to demonstrate
a change in competitive structure, not just an increase in prices).
89.
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466.
90.
See Erik N. Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions,
100 MINN. L. REV. (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 15-01, forthcoming 2016)
(“To be sure, privateers are among the class of patent owners who generally are not interested
in ultimately obtaining injunctions, since . . . they sell no products themselves and therefore do
not benefit from actually excluding competitors.”).
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fore be less likely to actually force out competitors in the market.91 There
may be price increases in terms of royalties paid by the competitors, but
such price increases are still not enough to make out a unilateral antitrust
violation under Section 2.92
Applying Section 5 of the FTC Act instead presents its own difficulties,
primarily due to well-founded concerns against expanding the scope of that
section beyond the rest of the antitrust laws. Section 5 prohibits “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”93 This highly broad
and potentially circular category certainly includes “any conduct that would
violate the Sherman Antitrust Act,”94 but its scope beyond that is exceedingly ill-defined. Federal courts have historically been reluctant to sustain
Section 5 cases beyond the scope of the Sherman Act given the “apparent
absence of limiting principles.”95 Nevertheless, “because settlement with the
FTC will be preferable to litigation in a wide array of circumstances, what is
considered illegal under Section 5 largely has become whatever at least three
Commissioners can agree on.”96 This tension and the resulting broad discretion for the FTC have created significant uncertainty,97 leading to inefficiencies through under- and over-compliance as well as needless rent-seeking
aimed at FTC decision-makers.98 Stretching Section 5 to encompass priva91.
Even in situations where the operating entity has more direct control or influence
over the privateer, the privateer still acts as an intermediary agent with its own profit-maximizing goals, goals that are at odds with securing injunctions or exclusion orders. In other words,
the use of a privateer can still only reduce the anticompetitive effects of circumventing licensing obligations.
92.
Rambus, 522 F.3d at 459.
93.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
94.
A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforce
ment-authority (last updated July 2008).
95.
William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 942 (2010). For
examples of this judicial pushback, see e.g., FTC v. Abbott Labs, 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C.
1992); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); FTC v. Boise
Cascade, 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1980). The 1984 DuPont ruling was the last time an appeals court addressed the reach
of Section 5.
96.
James Cooper, The Limits of Section 5’s Scope Beyond the Sherman Act, TRUTH ON
THE MARKET (Aug. 1, 2013), http://truthonthemarket.com/tag/sherman-act/#ftn7.
97.
This uncertainty persists even in the face of attempted clarification from the Commission itself. See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen: FTC
Act Section 5 Policy Statement, OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER (Sept. 21, 2015), https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/09/21/2015-23498/statement-of-enforcement-principles-regarding-unfair-methods-of-competition-under-section-5-of-the (“I appreciate the effort
to issue some form of guidance on the scope of Section 5 . . . . However, . . . what substance
the statement does offer ultimately provides more questions than answers . . . .”).
98.
James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 87, 91 (2015); Joshua
D. Wright, Revisiting Antitrust Institutions: The Case for Guidelines to Recalibrate the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5, CONCURRENCES: REVUE DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCE
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teering activity—even if limited to the most brazen evasions of licensing
obligations—exacerbates this tension, and these efficiency costs. A regulatory agency unmoored from textual limitations or external appellate review
threatens to chill innovation as much as privateering.
In addition to these enforcement limitations, it is possible that the underlying licensing obligation itself violates the antitrust laws. For example, the
Antitrust Division as well as the Federal Trade Commission have argued that
SSO rules prohibiting members from owning intellectual property rights in a
standard may constitute antitrust violations.99 SSOs that demand royalty
rates below a certain cap for all members could be liable for engaging in
“horizontal price fixing,”100 a per se violation.101 At least one federal court
has entertained this argument.102 If the underlying licensing obligation violates the antitrust laws, then enforcement would be impossible. Due to the
high costs of such a violation, SSOs may be chilled from using antitrust
officials to enforce their licensing obligations even when they are legal.
B. Solutions in Contract or Estoppel
As mentioned above, disputes over the scope of licensing obligations—
including whether those obligations follow a patent after a transfer to a privateer—are naturally seen as disputes over the terms of a contract. While the
law does not enforce all promises,103 where there has been offer, acceptance,
and consideration there is generally an enforceable contract.104 In the
FRAND context, for example, a patent holder makes an explicit promise to
[C OMPETITION L.J.] (Nov. 2013) (Fr.), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pub
lic_statements/siting-antitrust-institutions-case-guidelines-recalibrate-federal-trade-commis
sions-section-5-unfair/concurrences-4-2013.pdf.
99.
See, e.g., Amy A. Marasco, Vice President, American National Standards Institute,
Testimony before the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice: StandardsSetting Practices: Competition, Innovation and Consumer Welfare (April 18, 2002); In re Am.
Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’g, 106 F.T.C. 324, 329 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745, 753-54
(1999).
100.
Patrick D. Curran, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per
Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 1000 (2003); see also UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.1 at 24 (1995) (“[H]orizontal restraints [arising from joint patent ventures] often will
be evaluated under the rule of reason. In some circumstances, however, that analysis may be
truncated . . . some restraints may merit per se treatment, including price fixing . . . .”).
101.
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 332 (1982) (determining that maximum price-fixing agreements are illegal per se).
102.
See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179 (D.
Conn. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s motion to dismiss).
103.
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 1 (9th ed. 2008)
(“Not all promises are legally enforceable.”); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 75 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1932) (“No duty is generally imposed on one who makes . . . [a] promise . . . .”).
104.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 23 (1920).
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an SSO that it will grant licenses to anyone wishing to implement the new
standard, and in exchange the SSO adopts the patented technology as part of
the standard. These types of commitments have been increasingly described
as “contractual” by litigants and courts, and for good reason.105 The commitments are typically embodied in writing, perfectly suitable to the well-worn
tools of contractual interpretation.106 Moreover, the organizations and companies entering into these agreements are typically highly sophisticated commercial organizations, familiar and comfortable with contractual
arrangements. Hence, given the uniquely high costs of antitrust law, as well
as the Court’s explicit hesitation to leverage antitrust law when alternative
legal regimes exist,107 the existence of this relatively tidy solution should be
particularly compelling.
Admittedly, some minor conceptual roadblocks arise in terms of contract formation and enforcement, but the doctrine has largely already overcome them. In terms of contract formation, some licensing obligations are
structured as bylaws associated with membership in an SSO and are thus
governed by the law of business associations rather than contract law.108
Nevertheless, courts have recognized an implicit contractual relationship in
those circumstances: the SSO has “offered” the patent holder an opportunity
to participate in standards development, and the patent holder “accepted” by
agreeing to abide by the SSO’s policies.109 In terms of enforcement, it is
typically not the SSO attempting to enforce the licensing obligations, but
rather third-party operating entities seeking licenses.110 If these third-party
operating entities were found to be only incidental beneficiaries of the licensing obligations (as opposed to intended beneficiaries), they would not
have standing to sue.111 But thus far courts have generally adopted the theory
105.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2012) (“[T]he court
agrees with Microsoft that . . . Motorola has entered into binding contractual commitments to
license its essential patents on RAND terms.”); Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644
F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim); Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Electronics, 2:06-CV-63, 2007 WL 1202728, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 20, 2007) (noting that the licensing obligations were contractually binding).
106.
Some states require under a Statute of Frauds that certain contracts—such as those
covering more than $500 in goods or covering more than one year in duration—must be in
writing to be enforceable. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1624 (West 2015); U.C.C. § 2-201
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
107.
See Kobayashi and Wright, supra note 17, at 5; Kobayashi, supra note 17, at 3-4;
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 285, 277 (2007); Nynex Corp. v.
Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998).
108.
Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other
Patent Pledges, 2 UTAH L. REV. 479, 495 (2015).
109.
See Apple, Inc., v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1077 (W.D. Wis.
2012).
110.
Contreras, supra note 108, at 498.
111.
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302(1), 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992).
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that these potential licensees—those implementing the standard—were
clearly beneficiaries that the SSO had in mind at the time of formation.112 As
a result, even these potential licensees could seek enforcement of the SSO
licensing obligations against the promisor, the original patent owner.
Issues of contractual interpretation are sure to arise. Most importantly,
the original patent owner that entered into the contract with the SSO is likely
to argue that selling their patents off to a privateer did not constitute a
breach. After all, the original owner has not technically refused to license the
patent on FRAND terms; they simply no longer own the patent. Regardless
of whether that argument holds water,113 SSOs can simply redraft their licensing obligation agreements moving forward to foreclose such a strategy.
In short, once contract law becomes the standard regime for addressing these
disputes, future parties will simply negotiate for provisions specifically addressing the obligations of transferees if the courts fail to fill in the gaps.114
But even if contract law is seen as insufficient or inapplicable, another
clean solution lies in promissory estoppel. Generally speaking, “an informal
promise”—that is, one otherwise failing to satisfy the conditions of a contract—”may be enforceable by reason of action in reliance upon it.”115 The
basic elements of promissory estoppel are as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee of a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.116
In the context of licensing obligations, the existence of detrimental reliance
seems quite clear. Once the SSO has incorporated the patent into its new
standard, implementers will “invest substantial sums in the development,
manufacturing, marketing, and sale of products incorporating” those stanThe third-party beneficiary doctrine is currently recognized throughout the United States. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
112.
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Case No. C10-1823JLR at 10 (D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2012); Apple v. Motorola, No. 11cv-178-bbc, Opinion and Order, slip op. at 42 (W.D. Wis., Aug. 10, 2012); ESS Tech v. PCTel, No. C-99-20292, 1999 WL 33520483 (N.D. Cal. 1999). See also Kesan & Hayes, supra
note 85. Note generally that the failure to identify a specific beneficiary or group of beneficiaries is not fatal to raising a claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (“It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be
identified when a contract containing the promise is made.”).
113.
At least one federal court has already rejected that argument explicitly, holding that
the original patent owner can be liable for a subsequent owner’s repudiation of FRAND obligations. See Vizio v. Funai Elec. Co., No 09-0174 AHM (RCx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
114.
See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
115.
3-8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.3 (2015).
116.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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dards, typically alongside the process of acquiring licenses.117 By reneging
on licensing commitments, the patent holder preys upon that reliance to obtain greater surplus than they would have been able to beforehand.118 Nor do
the issues of third-party enforcement arise that might come up in contract
law.119 In fact, some SSOs have already seized upon the potential of estoppel
doctrine, including provisions in their licensing agreements designed to establish that the patent holder is aware that others will be relying on its
commitment:
By signing this Letter of Assurance, you represent that you have the
authority to bind the Submitted and all Affiliates . . . to the representations and commitments provided in this LOA and acknowledge that users and implementers of the [Proposed] IEEE Standard
identified in part C above are relying or will rely . . . on the terms of
this LOA.120
Overall, application of equitable relief through promissory estoppel provides
another natural fit where contract law comes up short.
Moreover, the remedies associated with contract law or promissory estoppel provide more than sufficient relief. An operating entity found to be
liable to the relevant SSO for failing to license along FRAND terms (by
selling its standards-essential patent to a noncompliant third-party) would
face significant damages,121 in addition to an injunction mandating that the
patents be made available on FRAND terms moving forward.122 The combination of damages plus an obligation to license should dissuade owners of
FRAND-encumbered patents from intentionally evading their obligations
through privateers. Even more so since, as mentioned before, these contracts
117.
Contreras, supra note 108, at 518.
118.
See Farrell et al., supra note 79.
119.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1915-16 (2002) (“While the law of contracts traditionally
did not enforce a promisee’s unsolicited reliance on a gratuitous promise, more modern cases
. . . permit both members and nonmembers to benefit from enforcement of the license.”).
120.
INST. OF ELEC. AND ELECTRONICS ENG’RS, Letter of Assurance for Essential Patent
Claims (Jan. 17, 2008), http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1788/Patents/letter-of-assuranceform.pdf.
121.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash.
2012), in which the court held Motorola liable for $14.5 million in contract damages for failing
to license its patents on FRAND terms. Dennis Crouch, RAND Agreement Proving Powerful
Limit on Patentee Action: Microsoft v. Motorola, PATENTLYO (Aug. 3, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/08/agreement-microsoft-motorola.html.
122.
Specific performance is not always available as a contract remedy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). However, courts have generally determined that, almost
by definition, a plaintiff without access to standards-essential patent licenses cannot be adequately made whole by damages alone. See, e.g., Microsoft, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023; Realtek
Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 (2013); GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc.,
No. 12-CV-2885, 2014 WL 1494247 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012).
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will become increasingly clear and these promises are becoming increasingly enforceable.
III. INCREASED COST

AND

FREQUENCY

OF

LITIGATION

Another primary argument for using antitrust law to curtail patent privateering is that privateering increases the frequency of patent infringement or
exclusion litigation, as well as the cost per suit relative to suits brought by
operating entities.123 It is argued that the costs of these suits and licenses are
distortionary124 and act as a “startup tax across the tech sector”125—essentially an anticompetitive barrier to market entry. Scholars have suggested a
variety of doctrinal footholds for antitrust law in this context, including Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the
FTC Act.126
Regardless of the cost and frequency of litigation, however, as long as
the underlying claims are meritorious, the Noerr-Pennington exception analyzed in Section I.B would still immunize the activity.127 The skepticism and
roadblocks in expanding Section 5 of the FTC Act would also still apply.128
But perhaps most significantly, this Article explores how the underlying assumptions as to the effects of patent trolls on cost and frequency of litigation
are themselves largely incorrect with respect to privateers. As explained below, since privateers favor fast settlement over prolonged litigation, privateers are not likely responsible for the increased amount of patent
assertions overall. Moreover, even if privateers have caused an increase in
the overall number of assertions, the suits brought by privateers should be
disproportionately meritorious.
A. Privateers Encourage Settlement, Not Litigation
The economic model for privateers is simple. Privateers do not practice
their patents or otherwise participate in the downstream product market. In123.
See, e.g., Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, to Legal Policy Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 4 (Apr. 5, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0058.pdf (“The [patent troll] business model is to make the litigation as expensive and disruptive as possible . . . .”); Comments
of Google et al., supra note 14, at 8-9 (claiming an “explosion” of “excessive litigation”
caused by patent trolls as well as an increase in total “costs confronting innovative industries”
as a result); Chien, supra note 38, at 477 (“[T]rolls make demands of many companies at once
in order to get nuisance settlements.”).
124.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 71 (Mar. 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/
110307patentreport.pdf.
125.
Jeff John Roberts, Obama Says Patent Trolls ‘Hijack’ and ‘Extort,’ So Do Something Mr. President, GIGAOM (Feb. 16, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/02/16/
obama-says-patent-trolls-hijack-and-extort-so-do-something-mr-president.
126.
See, e.g., Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 13, at 10-12.
127.
See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
128.
See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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stead, their sole source of revenue is licensing fees.129 Privateers thus avoid
litigation not only due to its inherent costs, but also because of the comparably reduced upside potential. For example, money damages are wholly unavailable in an infringement suit with the International Trade Commission
under 19 U.S.C. § 1337. And an injunction is significantly less valuable in
the hands of a privateer than an operating entity. Without any interest in
actual downstream product competition, an injunction is worth nothing on
its own, forcing the privateer to use it as a bargaining chip without the plausible threat of walking away from the table and profiting off the increased
market share itself. The downside risk of litigation remains high: a determination of non-infringement immunizes the defendant, and a determination of
invalidity would destroy the privateer’s only monetizable asset.
Patent privateers should also receive lower settlements than operating
entities, because of two key limitations as to the damages they could seek in
court.130 First, patent damages are generally awarded by juries,131 and patent
privateers—known tellingly as trolls in the public parlance—have no sympathetic story to tell of invention or improvement to the world. This reduces
the amount that juries tend to award privateers.132 Second, because privateers
do not practice the patents they own, they cannot claim lost profits.133 These
lost profits, which operating entities can seek, “should generally exceed the
statutory floor of reasonable royalties” ordinarily awarded as damages.134
These two factors help reduce the amount of damages that would be
awarded if a privateer actually took an operating entity to court. Hence, by
bargaining in the shadow of the law, those factors should also act to lower
settlement amounts compared to assertions made by operating entities.
Additionally, allowing operating entities to effectively “outsource” patent assertion promotes specialization. Not only does this specialization reduce the costs of litigation for the firm utilizing the privateer,135 but it also
129.
See, e.g., Tom Ewing, Introducing the Patent Privateers, 45 INTELLECTUAL ASSET
MGMT. MAG. 31, 35-36 (2011).
130.
For perhaps the most famous analysis of potential courtroom results shaping ex ante
negotiations, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
131.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Rush to Judgment? Trial Length and Outcomes in
Patent Cases, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 169, 173 tbl.1 (2013).
132.
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2139 & n.99.
133.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
134.
See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2140.
135.
The idea of task specialization as cost-reducing is at least as old as Adam Smith’s
discussions of labor economics, but has been most clearly articulated in this service context by
Professors Anders Akerman and Loriane Py. See Anders Akerman & Loriane Py, Service
Outsourcing and Specialization: A Theory Based on Endogeneous Task Scope (July 29, 2010)
(Stockholm University working paper) (on file with European Trade Study Group), http://
www.etsg.org/ETSG2010/papers/PY.pdf. See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS passim (1776).
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provides two mutually beneficial gains. First, it provides clearer information
for negotiation purposes. The privateer only has a handful of related patents
and is almost certainly a repeat player in terms of patent assertion. Hence, it
has likely acquired some degree of expertise on the market value of its licenses. Armed with this knowledge, the privateer and the operating entity
are less likely to end up in litigation.136 Second, by acting as a patent assertion specialist, a privateer reduces the negotiation costs for both parties relative to an operating entity. Their small, focused portfolios and few
employees shorten time spent on discovery or investigation.137 Their lack of
participation in the downstream market and potential for countersuit simplifies and brackets negotiations even further.
Finally, it should be pointed out that this tendency to quickly settle is
ultimately procompetitive. While injunctions and exclusion orders ultimately
force operating entities out of the market, settlements extracted by privateers
do not. Driven purely by a desire to maximize licensing revenue, and able to
engage in price discrimination, they have no incentive to “price out” any
competitor.138 The marketplace remains as robust as possible in terms of
number of participants, while still allowing for efficient monetization of intellectual property, thereby continuing to encourage innovation.
B. Privateers Do Not Increase the Rate of Patent Assertions
While the popular media has labeled patent trolls collectively as responsible for an increasing “onslaught of litigation,”139 the data suggest another
story. The rise in overall patent assertions can be easily explained by the
surge in issued patents, mandatory case disaggregation, and the increasingly
low quality of patents issued by the PTO—particularly for software patents.
136.
Any public information about a privateer’s negotiation, settlement, or litigation with
other operating entities serves to reduce informational asymmetry and minimize the likelihood
of divergent expectations, two major proposed determinants of when settlement will fail and
lead to litigation. See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993) (proposing an asymmetric information model).
But cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 33 (1984) (proposing a divergent expectations model).
137.
See, e.g., Letter From Ken Wasch, supra note 123 (“. . .PAEs have few, if any,
documents to produce or witnesses to be deposed.”).
138.
Comments of C. Graham Gerst, Patent Assertion Entities Activities Workshop,
supra note 13, at 124 (noting that patent trolls ask for money, settle, and allow the competitors
to ultimately continue producing whereas operating entities seek injunctions, ultimately thinning the marketplace); See supra note 33.
139.
Randall R. Rader et al., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html; see
also Timothy B. Lee, Here’s What it Feels Like to Be Sued by a Patent Troll, WASH. POST
(July 18, 2013); Diana Samuels, Patent Trolls Responsible for Growing Number of Lawsuits,
New Data Shows, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/blog/2012/10/patent-trolls-responsible-for-growing.html.
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Utility patents are “the most common type of patent,”140 covering “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”
(or improvement thereof).141 In practice, these patents cover everything from
mechanical devices and chemical compounds to computer software and
processes.142 In 1990, the PTO granted approximately 90,000 utility patents.143 In 2014, it granted 300,000, more than a 300% increase in less than
25 years.144 This increase in patent grants has tracked the increase in patent
suits over the last 25 years very closely; in particular, both feature strident
increases starting in 2009 compared to periods of measured growth in the
1990s.145
FIGURE 1. UTILITY PATENTS: FILLED

VS.

ISSUED, 1975 - 2012146

140.
3 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 8:1 (2d ed.) (2015).
141.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
142.
GREGORY E. UPCHURCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION GUIDE: PATENTS
AND TRADE SECRETS §§ 14:31-14:34 (2015); 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 5:13 (4th ed.) (2003).
143.
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR
YEARS 1963-2014, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last accessed
Jan. 31, 2016). See also Gene Quinn, The Rise of Patent Litigation in America: 1980-2012
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/09/the-rise-of-patent-litigation-inamerica-1980-2012/id=38910/.
144.
U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, supra note 143.
145.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 5 (July 2014), http://
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigationstudy.pdf.
146.
Quinn, supra note 143.
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FIGURE 2. PATENT CASES COMMENCED, 1980-2012147

In other words, patent assertions have increased, but at a rate roughly proportional to the rate of patents being issued.148 Inventors are patenting more
things, explaining at least some of the increase in patent suits and assertions.
Mandatory case disaggregation has also increased the number of apparent suits. The America Invents Act, passed in 2011, prohibits joining “multiple unrelated defendants to an action solely on the basis that they have each
allegedly infringed the patent-in-suit.”149 This has directly led to the apparent
surge in litigation since 2011 without actually changing the number of defendants or plaintiffs.150 Therefore, it is likely that at least part of the overall
increase in patent litigation is largely illusory.
Finally, the PTO has granted an increasing number of software patents,
which tend to be disproportionately litigation-prone. In 1991, software patents composed approximately 25% of all patents granted by the PTO; since
147.
Id.
148.
2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 145.
149.
George D. Medlock, Jr. & David Frist, Joinder: Over a Year After the America
Invents Act, 5 LANDSLIDE 44 (Mar. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslide/
march_apri_2013/joinder_over_a_year_after_the_america_invents_act.pdf. See generally
America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012).
150.
See Scott W. Doyle et al., The Impact of the America Invents Act on Litigation by
Non-Practicing Entities, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (May 9, 2013), http://
www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/05/The-Impact-of-theAmerica-Invents-Act-on-Litigat__/Files/View-full-memo-The-Impact-of-the-America-In
vents__/FileAttachment/TheImpactoftheAmericaInventsActonLitigationbyNon__.pdf; Robin
Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities (UC Hastings Research Paper No. 45, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2247195; Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99
MINN. L. REV. 649, 674-78 (2014).
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2011, a majority of patents granted have been software-related, and that proportion is still increasing.151 Lawsuits involving software-related patents accounted for 89% of the increase in defendants between 2007 and 2011
alone.152 And little wonder as to why—the software patents granted by the
PTO have been imprecise in scope, and many should not have been issued at
all. As the Government Accountability Office explained:
Language describing emerging technologies, such as software, may
be inherently imprecise because these technologies are constantly
evolving . . . claims in software patents sometimes define the scope
of the invention by encompassing an entire function—like sending
an email—rather than the specific means of performing that function . . . some patents, particularly software patents should never
have been issued because they were obvious, not novel, or lacked
definiteness.153
This failure has been so systemic as to necessitate some high-profile intervention from the Supreme Court,154 but it has not solved the problem entirely
or provided clear guidance moving forward.155
In short, “the focus on the identity of the litigant”—troll or not—”rather
than the type of patent” has been myopic.156 These low-quality, overbroad
software patents—combined with the aforementioned surge in issued patents
and mandatory case disaggregation—explains the increase in patent cases,
not privateering activity.
C. Privateers Facilitate Meritorious Patent Assertions
Even if privateers have caused an increase in patent assertions, most of
those claims are still ultimately meritorious. As explained in Section I.B,
151.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP
IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 11-13 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf.
152.
Id. at 21-24.
153.
Id. at 28-30.
154.
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359-60 (2014) (determining
that a particular software patent had merely added “a generic computer . . . perform[ing] generic computer functions” to an otherwise unpatentable abstract idea).
155.
See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Software Patents Still
Doesn’t Settle the Bigger Question, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (June 20, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/06/20/the-supreme-courts-decision-onsoftware-patents-still-doesnt-settle-the-bigger-question (“[The Court] didn’t do much to say
what kinds of software should be patentable. In other words, the court decided the most basic
conflict in the case, but more or less declined to offer guidance for other, future cases.”);
Robert Merges, Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alicewhat-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank (“To say we did not get an answer is to miss the
depth of the non-answer we did get.”).
156.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 151, at 45.
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privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents than
other kinds of patent trolls by virtue of acquiring them from operating entities.157 Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrowly targeted
towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats against
end users or entire industries. Taken together, these indicate that the privateer model would be expected to assert claims that are generally meritorious
as a rule.
Additionally, operating entities tend to use privateers to break up their
patent portfolios into intelligible, coherent chunks that make more sense for
assertion.158 For example, a company may have a vast portfolio overall, but
only a few patents relating to semiconductors. By splitting off a sub-portfolio of only the semiconductor patents, the privateer simplifies litigation for
all parties involved, minimizing the patents that need to be examined in any
dispute. Contrast this with what is sometimes called the IBM method of
intimidation, wherein an entire massive portfolio is coupled with vague
threats and used as a cudgel.159 During negotiations between Sun Microsystems and IBM in the 1980s, IBM’s chief negotiator was quoted as saying:
OK, maybe you don’t infringe these seven patents. But we have
10,000 U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk
[IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven patents you do
infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us $20
million?160
Perhaps ironically then, privateering actually contributes to meritorious
claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints
filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to
bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified
claims of infringement with IBM-style intimidation.
Analogizing to the world of litigation finance offers further evidence
that privateers ultimately assert disproportionately meritorious claims. The
business model of privateers is in many ways modeled after litigation financiers: buying up patents—”claims”—from operating entities that don’t have
the resources or willingness to bear the risk of litigation, and then asserting
them. Intellectual Ventures is perhaps the most well-publicized of these privateers, and they state their business model as such:
157.
See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
158.
See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 31, at 2159-60 (discussing the strategy of
portfolio disaggregation via privateers).
159.
See Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES (June 24, 2002), http://
www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html.
160.
Dan O’Connor, Patent Bully: Steve Jobs’ Unethical Use of Patents, PATENT PROGRESS (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/01/23/patent-bully-steve-jobs-un
ethical-use-of-patents.
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[I]magine an inventor out there, someone with a brilliant idea, a
breakthrough. This inventor has a patent, but still, companies are
stealing his idea and he doesn’t have the money or legal savvy to
stop them. That’s where Intellectual Ventures comes in. They buy
this inventor’s patent and make sure that companies who are using
the idea pay for it.161
Privateers, like litigation financiers, take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink
their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only
asset. Even where victorious, failure to reach a licensing agreement with the
infringer (resulting solely in an injunction or exclusion order) brings them
little or no financial benefit since they do not participate in the product market themselves. Moreover, where an operating entity maintains some kind of
partial interest in royalties that the privateer collects or sets minimum revenue targets, the stakes are raised even further.162 The result is that, like litigation financiers, privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest”
and “the underlying law giving rise to the . . . claim” favors their position as
plaintiff.163 In other words, privateers will avoid frivolous or unfounded
assertions.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that privateers, unlike pure litigation
financiers, already face sanctions and fee-shifting rules to the extent they
engage in frivolous litigation and other reprehensible tactics.164 Enforcement
and application of these rules is far from perfect, but the stakes for a privateer are proportionally much higher than for an operating entity. Most privateers—especially those created with singular purpose—do not have
particularly deep pockets: most patent trolls operate on $10 million or less in
revenue per year.165 Given that the legal costs of a patent suit can easily
161.
Statement of Alex Blumberg, This American Life: When Patents Attack!, CHICAGO
PUBLIC RADIO (July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/
transcript.
162.
See, e.g., Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 13, at 7.
163.
Joshua G. Richey, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489, 489 (2013).
164.
In particular, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49
(2014), facilitates fee-shifting in the patent assertion context for frivolous suits. See generally
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)-(c) (allowing a court to impose sanctions on an attorney, law firm, or
party where “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are [not] warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law,” or where “the factual contentions [do not] have evidentiary support”).
For examples of state law regimes, see IND. CODE ANN. § 34-52-1-1 (2013) and CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 128.5 (2013). Additionally, privateers risk losing the Noerr-Pennington immunity discussed earlier to the extent their lawsuits become objectively baseless. See supra notes
51-56 and accompanying text.
165.
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 08-13, Mar. 13, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2233041.
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exceed $5 million per litigant,166 one successful fee-shifting would likely
destroy most privateers. To pay the costs of litigation, the patent may even
be sold off—and snapped up by the former plaintiff. Thus, privateers have
strong incentives to assert their patents against operating entities that are
actually infringing them, rather than roll the dice with every competitor in
the industry.
In short, there is good reason to be skeptical of the extent to which
patent trolls in general can be blamed for the current patent landscape. This
skepticism should be at its highest when talking about privateers in particular, since they (1) encourage settlement rather than litigation, (2) have likely
not contributed to the increase in patent assertions, and (3) raise generally
meritorious claims. Combined with the Noerr-Pennington immunity and
Section 5 limitations, the argument for antitrust intervention due to privateer-created anticompetitive barriers to entry or “startup taxes” does not
withstand scrutiny.
IV. COLLUDING

VIA

PRIVATEERS

AND THE

LIMITED ROLE

FOR

ANTITRUST

Evasion of litigation constraints, evasion of licensing obligations, and
effects on the cost and frequency of patent litigation do not open the door to
antitrust involvement in privateering activity. That said, some forms of privateering activity would merit antitrust intervention. For example, where privateers are essentially used as instruments of collusion, antitrust has a
natural role to play. Two or more operating entities could hypothetically use
a privateer to pool their patents and wield them collectively against competitors not in the pool. This would be functionally identical to cross-licensing
and then agreeing, implicitly or explicitly, to sue all other competitors out of
the market—a practice that the Supreme Court has already confirmed violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act.167
Nor should the act of collusion be immunized simply because it occurs
through a third party like a privateer. That conclusion would run counter to
the very foundations of antitrust law. The Clayton Act, for example, was
designed to proscribe “holding companies . . . compan[ies] whose primary
purpose is to hold stocks of other companies” to form a collusive trust.168
Case law dating back to the turn of the century has supported this notion;169
unlawful collusion cannot be made lawful by laundering through a third
166.
For patent suits with an underlying claim over $25 million, average legal costs are
$5 million. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASS’N, 2013 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013aipla%20survey.pdf.
For suits where the underlying claim is between $1 million and $25 million, average legal
costs are still $2.8 million. Id.
167.
See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
168.
DAVID DALE MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 31 (1959).
169.
See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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party. Hence, antitrust has a clear role to play in policing privateers as agents
of collusion.
But the arguments for the role of antitrust law in regulating collusion are
not arguments for policing privateering activity in and of itself. This is simply a natural extension of the longstanding proscription against collusion
between competitors or anticompetitive mergers—a proscription unique to
the specialized laws of antitrust. The fundamental problem with most popular and academic arguments calling for antitrust intervention is that they fail
to recognize this distinction, and in turn the limitations inherent to antitrust
law. These limitations may be quasi-constitutional, such as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,170 or they may be practical, such as proving intent under
Section 2.171 Superimposed on these limitations is the notion—supported not
only by academics but also the Supreme Court—that when an alternative
regime to antitrust law is available, efficiency considerations dictate that antitrust’s role should be minimized.172
This is to say nothing of the more generalist arguments in favor of a
limited role for antitrust law. Antitrust violations are ultimately felonies, after all, so practices condemned by antitrust law “should not be . . . just over
the line,” but “so clearly beyond the pale . . . as to be subjects of strong
condemnation.”173 Given the highly broad and open text of the actual antitrust statutes, this is a particularly salient concern for voluntary compliance
and clarity.174 The particularly high cost of false positives—not only the direct costs of treble damages but also the inducement of rent-seeking activities—coupled with judges’ lack of economic or industry expertise suggests
minimizing the role of antitrust law as mere business regulator.175 In short,
there is good reason to be skeptical “about courts’ ability to separate good
conduct from bad” and “modest[ ] about what [antitrust] laws can do
well.”176 These arguments are convincing in their own right. But they mostly
serve here to highlight the fact that conduct without a clear anticompetitive
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
Ronald A. Cass, Competition in Antitrust Regulation: Law Beyond Limits, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 119, 129 (2010); see Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving
Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1
(1999).
174.
For example, Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids any “contract . . . in restraint of
trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). But any contract is in ‘restraint of trade,’ of course,
since it binds two parties to each other in some fashion, thus preventing them from doing that
business with anyone else without incurring the costs of breach. Where the text has failed to
provide a sensible answer, it has been up to the courts to develop a significant body of rules
and tests case-by-case.
175.
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984).
176.
Cass, supra note 173, at 131.
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valence—such as unilateral usage of privateering—should not be curtailed
by antitrust laws where alternatives are available.
CONCLUSION
Patent trolls may pose a problem for American innovation and industry.
Whether they pose an antitrust problem is a closer call, though, depending
on the particular type of patent troll and the activities they engage in. For
privateer patent trolls, antitrust law is almost certainly not the solution. Privateering may permit operating entities to circumvent litigation constraints,
but the litigation activity is almost certainly immunized from antitrust scrutiny. Transparency-based solutions offer a readily available alternative. Privateering may permit operating entities to evade licensing obligations, but
significant roadblocks prevent actually prosecuting that behavior. Contract
law or estoppel doctrine can provide relief instead. And in terms of the cost
and frequency of patent assertions, the valence of privateering activity is
uncertain at best. If anything, the increase in assertions is composed of disproportionately meritorious claims. Given the existence of alternative legal
solutions, the role of antitrust law in regulating privateers should be limited
and clearly grounded in uniquely antitrust concerns, such as collusion.

